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Abstract
Countries emerging  from civil war attract both aid and  and it has tended to taper out over the course of the
policy advice.  This paper provides the first systematic  decade.
empirical analysis  of aid and policy  reform  in the post-  The authors then investigate  whether the contribution
conflict growth process.  It is based  on a comprehensive  of policy to growth is systematically different in post-
data set of large  civil wars and covers 27 countries that  conflict countries,  and in  particular, whether particular
were in their first decade  of post-conflict  economic  components of policy are differentially  important.  For
recovery during  the 1990s.  this they use the World Bank policy  rating database.  The
Collier and Hoeffler first investigate whether the  authors find that growth is more sensitive to policy in
absorptive  capacity  for aid is systematically different  in  post-conflict societies.  Comparing  the efficacy of
post-conflict  countries. They find that during the first  different policies, they find that social policies are
three  post-conflict years, absorptive capacity  is no greater  differentially important  relative to macroeconomic
than normal,  but that in  the rest of the first decade  it is  policies.  However, historically,  this does not appear  to
approximately  double its normal  level. So ideally,  aid  have been how policy reform  has been prioritized  in
should phase  in during the  decade. Historically, aid  has  post-conflict  societies.
not, on average,  been higher in post-conflict societies,
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Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler1.  Introduction
In January 2002 the international  donor community pledged $4.5bn in aid to Afghanistan
for  post-conflict  reconstruction.  This  follows  similarly  substantial  donor  responses  in
East Timor and Bosnia.  By contrast,  donor responses  to the end of some  other conflicts
have been modest,  with the international  financial institutions  sometimes  constrained  by
the  problem  of arrears  of debt,  precluding  renewed  lending.  Evidently,  the  enormous
variation in response is because post-conflict  situations are sometimes  highly politicized.
However,  since  the  needs  of post-conflict  situations  compete  for  the  same  pool  of
resources devoted to aid for development,  it is useful to benchmark the efficacy of aid in
post-conflict  situations relative to development assistance more generally.
The  general  effectiveness  of aid  in  reducing  poverty  can  be  benchmarked  using  the
analysis  of Collier  and  Dollar  (2002).  They  first  estimate  a  relationship  between  aid,
policy and growth. They find that aid is subject to diminishing returns, but that absorptive
capacity is dependent upon the level of policy and institutions as measured by the World
Bank's annual rating, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).  They then
estimate  a  relationship  between  growth and poverty reduction:  the reduction  in poverty
depends  upon  the  extent  of poverty  and  upon  the  distribution  of income.  From  these
relationships  they estimate  a 'poverty-efficient'  allocation  of aid between  countries,  this
being the allocation that would maximize the reduction in poverty for a given overall aid
budget.  The  World  Bank's  allocation  rules  for  IDA,  its  concessional  lending  to  low-
income  countries,  now reflect  this  framework,  as  increasingly  does  the  allocation  of
bilateral  aid.  However,  post-conflict  situations  are  not  explicitly  considered  in  the
Collier-Dollar  analysis:  'poverty-efficient'  aid  for  post-conflict  countries  makes  no
allowance for their special circumstances  other than what is already reflected in the CPIA
rating.  The  economic  circumstances  of post-conflict  societies  are  distinctive  in several
respects  (Collier,  1999).  Typically,  opportunities  for  recovery  enable  a  phase  when
growth  is  supra-normal.  The  need  to  restore  infrastructure,  juxtaposed  against  the
collapse  of revenue,  tend  to make  aid  unusually productive.  However,  offsetting  this,
during  civil  war  the  normal  incentive  to  maintain  a  reputation  for  honesty  is  often
disrupted,  switching  the  society  into  a  persistent  high-corruption  equilibrium  (Tirole,
1992).  This,  together  with  the  weakening  of  civil  administration,  can  make  aid  less
effective. Hence, a priori, aid might be more or less productive in post-conflict societies.
Reflecting  the presurned  need for differential  treatment, the  IDA allocation  formula  has
recently  been  revised  to  allow  post-conflict  countries  to  receive  additional  temporary
resources. However, at present this is based on judgment rather than quantitative  analysis.
The primary purpose  of this  paper is to bring post-conflict  situations explicitly  into the
poverty-efficiency  framework  of aid  allocation.  The  resulting  benchmarks  are  all  the
more  necessary  given  the  highly  politicized  nature  of aid  allocation  in  post-conflict
situations.  Of course,  aid  in post-conflict  situations  has  legitimate  objectives  other than
poverty  reduction.  There is  a considerable  risk that  conflict will resume  and  aid might
directly reduce this risk beyond any effects via growth and poverty reduction.  However, a
benchmark in terms of the objective of poverty reduction can at least provide guidance  to
2donors as to the lower bound for appropriate response. Since aid tends, through its growth
effects,  to reduce  the  risk  of conflict  (Collier  and  Hoeffler,  2002),  the  aid  allocation
warranted on the criterion of poverty reduction will also contribute to peace-building.
A second purpose of the paper is to investigate whether and how priorities for the reform
of policies,  governance and institutions might differ in post-conflict societies from those
in other  developing countries.  At the most obvious  level, priorities  might differ because
some problems  are atypically  severe.  For example, if inflation were to be atypically high
in  post-conflict  situations  then  improved  macroeconomic  management  would  be
atypically  important.  Less  obviously,  some  reforms  might  be atypically  important  not
because the attained level of performance is worse than in other societies, but because the
economy is atypically sensitive to them.  We use a new data set on disaggregated  ratings
of different aspects of policy, governance and institutions to test for differential priorities.
In Section  2 we focus upon the pattern of post-conflict economic recovery.  We find that
there  is  typically  a brief phase  of supra-normal  growth.  In  Section  -3 we  investigate
whether  aid affects  growth differently  in post-conflict  situations,  and from this  estimate
the volume of aid that is appropriate  in post-conflict situations on the criterion of poverty-
reduction. We show that historically, the actual donor response to post-conflict situations
has not been poverty-efficient.  In Section 4 we turn to policy, investigating how priorities
between broad categories of policy - macroeconomic,  structural, social and govemance -
should be  distinctive in post-conflict  situations.  We  find that historically  there has been
no tendency of policies to reflect these priorities.
2.  The pattern of post-conflict  recovery
We  first  investigate  whether  there  are  exogenous  forces  for  economic  recovery  from
conflict,  in the sense that growth is more  rapid during the post-conflict  phase controlling
for policies and for aid inflows.
For the growth  relationship  we rely upon the analysis  and database  used  in the Collier-
Dollar growth regression (Collier and Dollar, 2002). This analyzes the per capita growth
rate  over  each  four-year  period  from  1974  to  1997  for  62  countries.  We  introduce
conflicts  into  this  analysis  using  the  database  of Collier  and  Hoeffler  (2002a),  which
provides  a  comprehensive  listing  and  dating  of civil  wars  for  1960-99.  They  use  a
definition of civil war that is conventional in the academic  literature: namely, an internal
conflict  between  a government  and an identifiable  rebel  organization  that  results  in at
least  1,000 combat-related  deaths, of which at least 5%  must be incurred on each side.
Most of these 73  wars did not end within the period analyzed by Collier and Dollar, or,
due  to data  limitations,  were  in  countries  other  than the  64  included  in their  analysis.
Table Al lists all those post-civil war situations  in the Collier and Hoeffler data set that
fall within the  1974-97 period analyzed by Collier and Dollar, and shows which of them
have sufficient  data to be included in the present analysis.
3The  Collier-Dollar  regression analyzes  growth  averaged  over four-year periods,  thereby
abstracting  from  short-term  fluctuations,  generating  344  growth  episodes.  We  wish  to
analyze the  after-effects  of conflict  for around  the  first decade  of peace.  We  therefore
consider three episodes: that in which the conflict ends, which we refer to as peace onset,
and  the  two  following  periods.  When  these  three  episodes  are  pooled  we  have  34
observations  for which we have complete  data.  When we look at individual  episodes  for
some  purposes  we  increase  the  number  of  observations  by  dropping  some  data-
constraining variables. At the maximum our analysis uses 48 post-conflict episodes.
The  first  column  of  Table  1  reproduces  the  core  Collier-Dollar  regression'.  The
regression  captures  the  effects  of  policy,  institutions,  governance  and  aid,  while
controlling  for the  initial  level  of income,  the  region,  and  the  time  period.  Policy  and
institutions,  as measured by the CPIA, and governance,  as measured  by the ICRGE,  both
directly  contribute  to  growth.  Aid  is  subject  to  diminishing  returns,  but  the  absorptive
capacity  for  aid  is  dependent  upon  policy  and institutions  - the  better  are  policy  and
institutions,  the  more  aid  can  be  absorbed  before  the  marginal  contribution  of aid  to
growth falls to zero.
In the second column of Table  1 we introduce a dummy variable for countries that are in
any of the three post-conflict episodes.  Thus, if a conflict ended in 1975, the post-conflict
dummy variable  would take the value of unity for each of the growth episodes  1974-77,
1978-81,  and  1982-85.  Thereafter,  the  dummy  would revert  to zero,  the  country  being
treated  as  'post-post-conflict'.  The  dummy  is  significant:  controlling  for  policy,
institutions,  governance  and  aid,  post-conflict  countries  on  average  grew  1.13%  more
rapidly than other countries.  Since the growth rate  for the average  country in the whole
sample was only 1.65%, this increment is substantial.
We  next  investigate  whether  this  additional  growth  has  any  temporal  pattern.  For
example,  it  might  be  concentrated  in  the  initial  post-conflict  years  as  the  economy
bounces  back.  Alternatively,  following  Olson's  classic  analysis  of  how  episodes  of
conflict can break the gridlock of pressure groups,  rapid growth might  be sustained over
many years.  We first focus on the  peace-onset  episode.  This is made  up of two  distinct
sub-periods,  that during which the war is being  fought, and that during which peace has
been  re-established.  The  net  effect  on  growth  during  the  episode  is  therefore  the
combination  of a war-effect  that  is likely to  be  negative,  and a  peace-onset  effect  that
may be  positive.  Hence,  in column  3 we  introduce  two  additional  variables.  The  first
measures  the number of war months during  each episode ('warmonths'),  and  the second
measures the number of months  of peace during the peace-onset  episode ('peace-onset').
The  latter  variable  tests  whether  growth  is  distinctive  following  the  onset  of peace.
Although these  variables  have  the  expected  signs,  neither  is  significant  (nor  are  they
significantly  different from each  other).  Evidently  the adverse  effects  of war  on growth
are  largely captured by the deterioration  in the CPIA, and there is no significant  bounce-
lFive observations  were mis-coded  in the original regression,  missing CPIA values being coded as zeros.
This is corrected in the present regression which accounts for the slight differences with the published
version.
4back  in  the  early  post-conflict  years  other  than  through  effects  captured  in  the
improvement in the CPIA.
In column 4 we focus on the second post-conflict episode, this being the first full period
of peace. Here,  we use a dummy variable to test for whether growth during this period is
distinctive.  To  maintain  comparability  with  the  Collier-Dollar  results  we  revert  to the
regression of column 2, dropping the two insignificant variables added in column  3.  The
dummy  variable  is  significant  and  substantial  - during  this  period  the  growth  rate  is
nearly two percentage points above normal. In column 5 we replace this dummy with one
for the  third  post-conflict  episode.  Both  statistical  and  economic  significance  are  now
reduced:  supra-normal  growth is 1.2%.
These  results  suggest that post-conflict  deviations  from the  normal  growth  relationship
follow  an  inverted-U  pattern  over  the  first  post-conflict  decade.  However,  since  the
dating of the four-year  growth episodes  in the Collier-Dollar  analysis  is exogenous,  the
above approach lacks precision:  the  first post-conflict period may contain anything from
zero  to 47 months of peace,  and  although  the  second  post-conflict  period  will  always
contain 48 months of peace, these may range  from starting in the second month of peace,
through to  starting in the 48th month. To try to get more precision as to when in the post-
conflict  period  growth  is  supra-normal,  in  Table  2  we  therefore  replace  the  period
dummies with eight variables  defined in terms of the time that has lapsed since the end of
the  conflict.  Thus,  'Year  1'  measures  the number  of months  in the growth episode  that
meet  the criterion  of being during the  first  12  months of the  end of the war.  Similarly,
'Year  2'  measures  the  number  of months  during  the  growth  episode  that  meet  the
criterion  of being  between  the  13th  and  the  24h month  after the  end  of the  war.  The
variables between  them span the first eight years  post-conflict.  Given these  definitions,
the values of the variables are logically interdependent.  For example, if 'Year  4' takes the
value  of 12, then 'Year 8' must take  the value of zero,  while 'Year  5'  is highly likely to
be non-zero.  This interdependence  makes  it inappropriate  to enter the variables  into the
regression  collectively,  and  in  colums  1-8  we  enter  them  individually.  Even  so  the
interpretation  of the variables must be treated with caution:  for example,  the coefficient
on  Year  4' will  capture  not only the  effect  of the  fourth  year of peace,  but also  the
effects of those years  for which the other year variables  are likely to be  non-zero.  With
these  caveats,  the variables  representing  the first  four  years  of peace  are  insignificant
(with the fourth being borderline), the variables representing the fifth through the seventh
year are all significant, with the size of the coefficient  rising through to the sixth year and
then declining  in the seventh.  The variable  for the  eighth year  reverts to  insignificance.
This suggests that the peak phase for supra-normal  growth is between  the fourth or fifth
and  seventh  years  of post-conflict  peace.  We  test  this  further  by  replacing  the  year
variables by two dummy variables.  The first takes the value of unity if the growth episode
contains  any months that fall within the  first three  years of peace (that  is, if any  of the
first three  'Year'  variables are non-zero).  The  second dummy variable  takes the value of
unity if and of the  'Year'  variables  4 through  7 are  non-zero.  The  results  are  shown in
column  9.  The first  variable  is  insignificant,  whereas  the second  variable  is  significant
and substantial - the supra-normal growth rate is 1.5%.
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approaches.  The  first  defines  three  four-year  episodes:  peace  onset  and  the  two
subsequent  periods. The second  allows us to date  the onset of peace more precisely  but
encounters  some  difficulties  of  interpretation.  Both  approaches  reveal  an  inverted-U
pattern.  On  the  first  approach  supra-normal  growth  peaks  in the  second  period.  This
period will range from being virtually the first four years of peace to virtually the second
four years of peace. The second approach dates the peak growth phase more precisely as
being  from the fourth  to the  seventh year  of peace.  Such a pattern of recovery  is not  a
priori surprising.  In  the  immediate  aftermath  of conflict  there  are  probably  many
uncertainties,  and basic functions of government have yet to be re-established.  If peace  is
maintained there  is then a phase of catch-up, but this peters out and the economy reverts
to its long-run growth rate.
3.  Aid during recovery
Thus,  for  a  relatively  short  phase  post-conflict,  growth  is  supra-normal.  We  now
investigate  the  contribution  of  aid,  especially  during  this  phase.  The  Collier-Dollar
analysis of growth found that growth is augmented both by aid and by policy, supporting,
with a broader measure of policy,  the prior analysis  of Burnside  and Dollar (2001).  The
supra-normal  growth phase  could be due to a changed relationship  between  aid,  policy
and growth:  most notably for our present purposes it could  be because  aid  is atypically
effective.  However,  it could  also be  because  of some  effect  exogenous  to  both  aid and
policy:  for  example,  peace  simply  enables  normal  economic  activity to  be  resumed  so
that the economy bounces back.
We decompose  supra-normal  growth by introducing terms that interact the aid and policy
variables  with the post-conflict  dummies  for each of the  three  episodes.  In the baseline
Collier-Dollar model  there  are three  such potential  interactions  - with  aid,  with policy,
and with the policy-aid  interaction.2 We initially focus on the first full four-year period of
peace,  since this  is  the period  during  which growth  is supra-normal.  We  introduce  all
three interaction terms and proceed with stepwise reduction to those that are  significant.
This is shown in the first four columns of Table 3.  The stepwise reduction eliminates the
direct effect of post-conflict on growth as insignificant.  Supra-normal  growth  is not due
to  automatic  'bounce-back'.  The final  regression  (column  4)  retains  only  one  route  by
which  post-conflict  effects  growth,  namely  the  interaction  between  the  post-conflict
dummy  and  the  aid-policy  interaction  variable.  This  new  double  interaction  term  is
highly significant both in the statistical  sense and in the economic sense.
The  coefficient  on  the  new  term  has  important  implications  for  aid' absorption  post-
conflict.  The  Collier-Dollar  analysis  finds that  aid  is  subject to  diminishing returns,  so
2  Potentially, aid can enter the regression twice, both directly and squared.  The squared term is necessary to
capture diminishing returns, but, given the inclusion of the aid-policy interaction  term, whether a separate
term for the direct effect of aid is needed is entirely an empirical matter.  Collier and Dollar (2002) show
that when such a term is included it is insignificant and so it is dropped from their core regression.
6that at some point - the saturation  point - aid becomes ineffective  in raising growth. The
saturation point depends  upon policy - the better is policy the greater the amount of aid
that can be productively  absorbed. The growth regression takes the form:
g = a + bAP - cA2 (1)
where:
g  the growth rate
A = aid (as a share of GDP)
P = policy and institutions (as measured by the CPIA).
The contribution of aid to growth is thus:
dg/dA = bP - 2cA  (2)
so that the saturation point, As, is defined by:
As = (b/2c)P.  (3)
In the baseline Collier-Dollar  regression reported  in Table  1,  column 2, the coefficients
imply  that  the  saturation point  is  2.5  times the  CPIA  score.  A typical  CPIA score  is
around three,  so that the result implies that normal absorptive capacity for aid has a limit
of around 7.5%  of GDP. It is important to note that in the  Collier-Dollar  analysis  aid is
measured at purchasing  power parity prices.  With the more conventional measure  of aid
at prevailing exchange rates, this would translate into around 20% of GDP.
The results of Table 3,  column 4, decompose the saturation point into that which applies
in the first full period of post-conflict  peace, and all other observations.  The introduction
of the post-conflict  term slightly reduces  the estimate  of the  saturation point  in normal
circumstances  to  2.27  times the  CPIA.  However,  the  estimate  of the  saturation  point
during  post-conflict  is  dramatically  larger,  at  5.59  times  the  CPIA.  Thus,  conditional
upon policy and institutions, post-conflict countries have more than double the absorptive
capacity for aid of that in more normal circumstances.
It does not necessarily  follow from this that post-conflict  countries  should get more aid
that other  countries  with  similar  levels  of poverty.  Allowance  must  be made  for  the
unsurprising  fact that policies and institutions tend to be less satisfactory  in post-conflict
situations.  Hence, the greater absorptive capacity conditional upon policy, is qualitatively
offset  by worse  policy:  To quantify  this,  for the  1990s  we compare  the  average  CPIA
score for all countries with that for those countries  in their first full period of post-conflict
peace.  The former is 3.00  and the  latter is 2.88. The typical country in its first full four-
year  period of post-conflict peace  thus has a saturation point around 2.36 times that for
the typical country in other circumstances.3
3  (2.88/3.OO).(5.59/2.27)  = 2.36.
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a temporary  growth spurt of around two percentage points per year in excess of normal
growth.  This growth spurt is largely,  or entirely, dependent upon aid:  for given policies
aid is  more  than  twice  as  productive  in post-conflict  circumstances,  and  so  at  normal
levels of aid, growth is higher. In the absence of aid there would be no growth spurt.
We next consider  whether these effects of aid are distinct to the first full period of post-
conflict peace.  To investigate the effects of peace onset we use the 'peace-onset'  variable
analogously to our previous use of the  dummy  for the first full episode  of peace,  again
using a stepwise process of reduction.  The results, reported in Table 3 columns 5-8, show
that there is no significant growth effect through any route during the peace onset period.
Recall that there is also no supra-normal  growth in this period. To investigate the effects
during the second full peace episode is  problematic:  there are only seven countries  in the
Collier-Dollar  sample  that  have  completed  this  peace  period  and  such  a  sample  is
evidently too small for meaningful  analysis.  Recall that there are indications that after the
first  full  peace  period the  supra-normal  growth  effect  starts  to fade.  Presumably,  post-
conflict countries gradually revert to the normal growth relationships.
To  summarize,  the  end  of a civil  war  creates  a  temporary  phase  during  which aid  is
particularly  effective  in the growth process.  Our results  suggest that during the first full
peace period the absorptive capacity for aid is around double its normal level. As with aid
in more normal circumstances,  absorptive capacity  depends upon policy, but, conditional
upon policy, aid is considerably more effective.  Although policy is worse in post-conflict
societies  than in most other  societies,  this is insufficient to offset the greater  absorptive
capacity,  so  that  post-conflict  societies  constitute  an  important  exception  to  the
proposition that for given levels of poverty,  aid should be lower in societies with worse
policies.
Our results  also  suggest  that the  increased  scope  for effective  aid absorption  does  not
occur  immediately.  There  is  neither  a supra-normal  growth  effect  nor  a supra-normal
effect  of aid in  the  peace  onset  period.  Since  the  moment  of peace  onset  is  randomly
distributed  across the four-year peace-onset episode,  its average length is two years.  We
have  also found that,  there appears  to be  no supra normal  growth  effect during  the first
three  years  of  peace,  or  beyond  the  seventh  year  of  peace.  Hence,  there  is  some
presumption  that  the key  period  during which  aid absorption  is  exceptionally  high  is
approximately between the fourth and the seventh year of peace.  From the perspective of
effective  use of aid for economic  recovery, aid volumes should gradually build up during
the first few years of peace,  and gradually revert to normal levels  after around a decade.
We  should  stress  that. these  results  are  tentative:  as  data  for  the  episode  1998-2001
become  available,  the  sample  of post-conflict  countries  will  increase  and  the  results
should be re-assessed.
With this caveat we now compare  the proposed pattern of aid to post-conflict  situations
with the actual pattern. In Table  4 we change  the dependent variable from growth to aid.
In  the  baseline  regression  (column  1) aid  is  investigated  as  a  function  of per  capita
income,  total population,  region,  policy,  time period,  and  'warmonths'.  Unsurprisingly,
8donors sharply reduce aid during periods of active  conflict.  In the next three columns we
introduce  in turn variables  for  the  three  post-conflict  episodes.  The  number  of peace-
onset months is positive  but insignificant,  suggesting that donors rapidly restore aid once
peace is restored,  at least to normal levels and perhaps in excess of normal  levels.  The
dummies for the first and second full peace periods are negative and large with the latter
being significant.  Donors are at most funding  at normal levels and, after an initial spurt,
are phasing aid out even during this first decade of peace,  reducing it below levels normal
for other countries with similar circumstances.
An implication  of the above  analysis is that donors  have  not responded appropriately  to
post-conflict situations. The initial response during the peace-onset period - typically the
first two years - has indeed restored lending, perhaps (on the narrow criterion of poverty
reduction)  even excessively, but thereafter  aid should have continued to taper in whereas
it  has  tended  to  taper  out.  This  is  consistent  with  other  evidence  that  suggests  that
historically  donors have  not been very responsive  to growth opportunities  (Alesina  and
Dollar, 2000).  The recent experiences of Afghanistan and East Timor suggest that donor
behavior  may be  changing:  the volume of aid  allocated to post-conflict  situations  may
well have increased substantially,  which on our analysis would be appropriate.  However,
the timing of the inflow may not be appropriate,  arriving too soon and tapering out too
early. For example, the present rules concerning IDA allocation to post-conflict allow for
supra-normal  aid allocations  only in the first three years of peace, which on our analysis
is too early  for effective  absorption.  Of course,  the benchmarks  provided by regression
analysis,  especially  on  such  a  small  sample  of episodes,  can  provide  only  limited
guidance.  Each  situation  will  appropriately  be  assessed  using  much  richer  country-
specific  information.  However,  given the highly politicized  context of aid allocations  in
post-conflict  situations,  it  would  not  be  surprising  if historically  they  have  not  been
appropriately aligned with the opportunities for reinforcing economic recovery.
4. Policy priorities during recovery
We now turn to the question of whether policy priorities for growth should be distinctive
in post-conflict  societies.  The  previous analysis  has already  implicitly  answered this at
the aggregate  level  of policy  captured  by the overall  CPIA rating,  which  is an average
over ratings of twenty  different particular policies.  Since the effect of aid is  dependent
upon policy,  as measured by the CPIA, the better is policy, the larger is the growth spurt.
Thus,  when  policy  reform  is  coordinated  with  aid  flows,  it  is  atypically  effective  in
promoting  growth in post-conflict  situations.  The previous analysis has also found that
the interaction  term between policy and the three post-conflict  variables  is insignificant.
Hence,  other than through its effects on enhancing aid absorption, policy  is neither more
nor less  important  for growth  in post-conflict  situations than in other  situations.  Policy
.matters  more  in  post-conflict  situations  because  it  differentially  augments  the
effectiveness of aid.
We  now  investigate  whether particular policies  are  differentially  important  in  post-
conflict  situations.  For  this  we  disaggregate  the  overall  policy  rating  into  four
9components:  macro,  structural, social and governance.  This disaggregation  is dictated by
the availability  of data, but it corresponds to important broad categories  of policy and so
is  potentially  useful.  The  data  on  macro,  structural  and  social  policies  are  from  the
components of the CPIA ratings and are available  since  1990.  Prior to this the CPIA was
only an aggregate  indicator of policy.  Within the CPIA each of these three components  is
scored on a scale,  1-5.  Thus, if one component has a lower score than another this has no
intrinsic  meaning. However,  in practice, the mean values of the three components are all
very similar:  during the  1  990s the average rating for macro policies was 4% higher than
for structural  policies,  and  6%  higher  than  for social  policies.  This  suggests  that  each
component of the  scale  was approximately  ordinal,  with a country that was average  for
macroeconomic  policies,  getting  approximately  the  same  rating on these  policies  as the
rating for social policies for a country that was average  for those policies.  In addition to
the  CPIA,  which is measured  on a common basis  by World  Bank  staff, the  ICRGE is
used to measure governance. Again,  this is a subjective assessment on a scale of 1-6.
In Table 5  we compare post-conflict  countries with all countries in respect of these four
aspects of policy for the  1990s. The macro, structural  and social policy scores are shown
as relative to the overall CPIA score.
Unsurprisingly,  post-conflict societies  have worse CPIA  scores than other societies.  The
scores  by  post-conflict  episode  reveal  a  steady  improvement  as  long  as  peace  is
maintained.  In the peace-onset  period  the  CPIA is only 2.41,  in the first full period of
peace it is 2.88, and in the second full peace period it has risen to 3.05 and so is in effect
back to normal.  Hence, the phase of distinctively  problematic policy  is the first 4-8 years
post-conflict.  However,  although the  level of overall policy is distinctively  poor during
this  period,  there  appears  to  be  no  systematic  difference  between  policies.  Macro,
structural and social policy scores are all equally discounted in post-conflict countries and
show fairly uniform improvements during the three post-conflict periods.  Governance, as
measured  by the  ICRGE,  is markedly  worse  during the  peace  onset period,  than other
developing  countries.  However,  in contrast to the CPIA components,  it actually  appears
to deteriorate over the ensuing decade.
We now return to the regression  analysis,  introducing  terms which  interact each of the
four components of policy with a post-conflict dummy variable. This tests whether any of
these  policies is differentially  important  for growth in post-conflict  situations  and hence
provides  some  guidance  as to priorities  for policy improvement.  Since  our analysis  can
only be conducted  for the period since  1990, the number of post-conflict  observations  is
too small  to permit  disaggregation  into the three distinct post-conflict  episodes analyzed
above  so that the post-conflict dummy refers to all three episodes.
In Table 6, column  1 we add the interaction term for governance.  The interaction term is
insignificant,  so that governance  is approximately  as important for growth in post-conflict
situations as in other contexts.
Macro,  structural and social policy scores on the CPIA are too highly correlated with the
overall  CPIA to be entered together  in the  same regression.  To overcome  this problem,
10we measure  each relative to the average  CPIA score.  Thus,  we retain  the overall  CPIA
score in the regression and add variables showing how the components  deviate  from the
overall  score.  Evidently,  since  the  overall  score  is  simply  the  average  of its  three
components,  once  the  deviation  of any  two  of the  components  from  the  average  is
specified, the deviation of the third component is also determined.  Hence, only two of the
deviations in the components can be entered together in the regression.  In Table 6 column
2  we  introduce  the  deviations  for  the  macro  and  social  components  of the  CPIA  as
additional  variables,  and  also  the  interactions  of these  terms -with  the  post-conflict
dummy, so that structural policies are the excluded term and so the benchmark.
Since the regression is run for all episodes  since  1974, but the disaggregated CPIA data is
only available  for the  1990s, we  initially include  both a dummy variable  for the  1990s
and  an interaction  of this  dummy  with the  overall  CPIA  score.  This  allows  both that
exogenous  growth  might  have  been  different  during  this  period  and  that the  effect of
policy might have been different. Without these terms the CPIA component terms might
be spuriously picking up such effects. In the event,  neither term is significant and they are
dropped from the regression.
The regression includes the direct effect of the macro and social components  of the CPIA
(i.e. without being interacted  with the post-conflict dummy). These terms are necessary in
order to determine how the  effects of these components  of policy are distinctive  in post-
conflict situations, through their interaction with the post-conflict  dummy.  However, the
temptation  to interpret  these  direct effects  as showing  which components  of policy are
most important for growth outside the context of post-conflict should be resisted.  All they
show is what would happen if the three  component parts  of the  CPIA  score  were to be
varied  in such a way as to keep the  aggregate  score constant.  At the most,  these results
will tell us that the  reforms  represented  by a one point increase in one  component  are
more valuable for growth than the reforms represented  by a one point increase  in another
component.  They  are  therefore  a  comment  not upon the  relative  importance  of macro,
structural and  social policies,  but upon the scoring systems for them. There  is no reason
why  a one point change  in one component should be in any sense commensurate  with  a
one point increase in another component.
While the  direct effects of the three policy components  must therefore be dismissed,  the
variables  generated  by interacting  the policy  components  with the post-conflict  dummy
are  readily interpretable.  They test for whether policy  priorities should be distinctive  in
post-conflict  situations when compared to other circumstances.  Both the interaction terms
are  significant, with macro negative  and social positive. Further,  the  coefficients  on both
terms  are large. Given the  objective of promoting growth,  consider priorities as between
macro,  structural and social reforms in two societies with identical  CPIA scores  on each
component,  one society  being post-conflict  and the  other having  no history of conflict.
The  results  tell  us  that  the  post-conflict  society  should  pay  more  attention  to
improvements  in social policy than the other society,  and less attention to improvements
in  macro  policy.  This formulation  of the  result  is not only  meaningful,  it is  pertinent.
Post-conflict  situations  constitute  only  a small  minority of the  situations on  which IFI
experience  is  based.  Hence,  in the  absence  of such  knowledge,  IFI  staff are  likely  to
11advise  for  post-conflict  situations  those  policy  priorities  that  are  effective  in  normal
circumstances.  While  the  broad  direction  of such advice  might  be  correct,  our  results
suggest  that  priorities  based  on  general  experience  are  likely  to  be  misplaced.  For
example,  suppose  that  a  post-conflict  society  starts  with  each  component  - macro,
structural  and  social  - rated  at  2.5,  and  the  matter  for judgment  is  whether  a  small
improvement in social policies at the expense of a small deterioration in macroeconomic
policies  would  be  advisable  from  the  perspective  of growth.  To  be  specific,  let  these
small  changes  in  policy  amount  to  an  improvement  in  social  policies  to  2.6  and  a
deterioration  in macroeconomic  policies to  2.4.  The coefficients  on the  direct  effects of
these  components  of policy  suggest  that  were  the  situation  not post-conflict,  such  a
change  would reduce  growth.  By  contrast,  in a post-conflict  situation  growth  would be
increased by around one percentage  point.
We  can  also  distinguish to an  extent  between  the  two possible  ways  by which  policy
priorities might be  distinctive - differential  severity of policy problems  and differential
effects  of policies.  Recall  that the three  components of the  CPIA are all  equally poor  in
post-conflict  situations.  There does  not appear to be  differential  deterioration.  Hence,  it
appears  that the  differential  importance of social policy is not because  social policies are
differentially  bad  in  post-conflict  situations,  but  rather  that  they  are  differentially
important.  This  is  indeed  consistent  with  much  of the  practical  policy  work  in  post-
conflict  situations  which  tends  to prioritize  social  issues.  However,  recall from  Table  5
that  the  policy ratings  tend  to  improve through  the  various  phases  of post-conflict  in
tandem.  Our analysis suggests that it would be desirable if social policy could improve at
a  faster rate  than  structural  policy,  which  in  turn  should  improve  at  a faster  rate  than
macro policy. This is decidedly not to say that macro does not matter.  In post-conflict,  as
elsewhere,  everything  matters.  But the practical process of reform is always a matter of
priorities.
5.  Conclusion
Countries  coming  out  of conflict  are  in  atypical  need  of both financial  resources  and
policy advice.  Their  societies  are  often extremely  fragile  and so it is  important that the
response  of the  international  development  community  should  be  as  appropriate  as
possible.  Although  such  situations  are  becoming  more  common,  they  still  constitute  a
small minority of development experience,  and so there is a danger that they will receive
both  finance  and  advice  that  largely  ignores  their  special  characteristics.  Most  donors
now have  units specially  dedicated  to post-conflict,  but  to date the  learning  process has
largely  been  highly  context-specific.  Indeed,  a  common  assessment  from  policy
practitioners is that each situation is so distinctive that there are no general lessons.  In this
paper  we  have  investigated  post-conflict  economic  recovery  statistically,  using  all
episodes  for which  data are  available.  Since  the  number  of such observations  is  quite
limited,  the  degree of confidence  in the results must be correspondingly  discounted.  The
basis  for our analysis has' been  to incorporate  post-conflict  situations  explicitly  into the
existing  analysis  of the  relationship  between  aid,  policy  and  growth  as  undertaken  in
Collier and Dollar (2002). Two general patterns have emerged from this analysis.
12First,  we  find  that  aid  is  considerably  more  effective  in  augmenting  growth  in  post-
conflict  situations than in other  situations.  For  'poverty  efficiency',  aid volumes  should
be  approximately  double  those  in other  situations.  The  pattern  of aid  disbursements
should  probably  gradually  rise  during  the  first four  years,  and  gradually  taper  back to
normal  levels  by the  end of the first post-conflict  decade.  Actual aid  practice  has  not,
historically, followed this pattern.
Second,  we  find that among  policies  the  key priorities  for improvement,  relative  to an
otherwise  similar society without  a history of recent  conflict,  should  be  social  policies
first,  sectoral  policies  second,  broadly  with the  same priority  as  in other contexts,  and
macro  policies  last.  Again,  actual  improvements  in policies  during  the first  decade  of
peace do not appear to reflect these priorities: all policies other than governance appear to
improve more or less in tandem.
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14Table  1: The Pattern of Post-Conflict  Recovery
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Initial per capita income  0.725  0.738  0.699  0.727  0.717
(0.620)  (0.619)  (0.623)  (0.619)  (0.620)
Governance  (ICRGE)  0.146  0.232  0.136  0.212  0.175
(0.159)  (0.156)  (0.160)  (0.155)  (0.160)
CPIA  1.027  0.959  1.006  0.957  0.992
(0.396)***  (0.396)**  (0.392)**  (0.392)**  (0.397)**
(ODA/GDP) x CPIA  0.145  0.157  0.142  0.151  0.150
(0.065)**  (0.065)**  (0.066)**  (0.064)**  (0.065)**
(ODA/GDP)2 -0.029  -0.031  -0.029  -0.030  -0.029
(0.013)**  (0.013)**  (0.013)**  (0.012)**  (0.013)**
South Asia  2.657  2.488  2.691  2.572  2.569
(0.623)***  (0.627)***  (0.629)***  (0.626)***  (0.620)***
East Asia  2.886  2.823  2.952  2.891  2.870
(0.662)***  (0.660)***  (0.652)***  (0.662)***  (0.659)***
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.502  -0.612  -0.514  -0.589  -0.578
(0.812)  (0.807)  (0.816)  (0.797)  (0.811)
Middle East/North Africa  1.546  1.516  1.569  1.543  1.512
(0.554)***  (0.562)***  (0.556)***  (0.565)***  (0.554)***
Europe/Central  Asia  -0.347  -0.440  -0.287  -0.436  -0.387
(1.055)  (1.046)  (1.063)  (1.053)  (1.050)
Post-conflict 0-2  1.133
(0.605)*




Post-conflict  1  1.889
(0.763)**
Post-conflict 2  1.158
(0.815)
Observations  344  344  344  344  344
Post-conflict observations  34  34  13  13  8
_____________________________  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  ""*  significant at
1%. All regressions include time dummies which are jointly significant.
15Table 2: Year by Year Examination of Post-Conflict  Recovery
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Initial per  0.727  0.722  0.728  0.733  0.727  0.726  0.723  0.731  0.718
capita income  (0.620)  (0.622)  (0.622)  (0.620)  (0.619)  (0.619)  (0.619)  (0.621)  (0.618)
Governance  0.158  0.143  0.156  0.187  0.212  0.228  0.194  0.180  0.236
(ICRGE)  (0.161)  (0.160)  (0.155)  (0.156)  (0.155)  (0.155)  (0.160)  (0.158)  (0.156)
CPIA  1.034  1.025  1.019  0.986  0.957  0.931  0.979  1.009  0.954
(0.395)***  (0.395)***  (0.397)**  (0.393)*  (0.392)**  (0.393)**  (0.396)**  (0.396)"  (0.391)**
(ODA/GDP) x  0.146  0.145  0.147  0.151  0.151  0.154  0.152  0.150  0.155
CPIA  (0.065)*  (0.066)**  (0.066)**  (0.065)**  (0.064)**  (0.063)**  (0.064)**  (0.066)**  (0.063)**
(ODA/GDP)2  -0.029  -0.029  -0.029  -0.030  -0.030  -0.030  -0.030  -0.029  -0.031
(0.013)**  (0.013)*  (0.013)**  (0.013)**  (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.013)**  (0.012)**
South Asia  2.669  2.657  2.660  2.612  2.572  2.559  2.551  2.653  2.573
(0.626)"'  (0.624)***  (0.622)*"  (0.624)***  (0.626)***  (0.626)"**  (0.624)***  (0.625)**  (0.618)'*
East Asia  2.857  2.891  2.887  2.893  2.891  2.905  2.864  2.852  2.869
(0.668)"'  (0.665)***  (0.663)***  (0.662)***  (0.662)***  (0.661)***  (0.657)*'*  (0.666)***  (0.656)***
Sub-Saharan  -0.494  -0.504  -0.507  -0.558  -0.589  -0.618  -0.604  -0.529  -0.615
Africa  (0.813)  (0.812)  (0.811)  (0.807)  (0.797)  (0.796)  (0.810)  (0.811)  (0.801)
Middle Eastt  1.569  1.547  1.548  1.545  1.543  1.538  1.514  1.542  1.535
North Africa  (0.553)**  (0.554)**  (0.556)***  (0.562)***  (0.565)***  (0.553)***  (0.554)***  (0.559)"'*  (0.562)***
Europe/Central  -0.351  -0.345  -0.359  -0.400  -0.436  -0.439  -0.410  -0.382  -0.449
Asia  (1.054)  (1.058)  (1.053)  (1.051)  (1.053)  (1.062)  (1.047)  (1.054)  (1.045)
First post-  0.071
conflict year  (0.131)
Second post-  -0.017
conflict year  (0.110)
Third post-  0.029
conflict year  (0.098)
Fourth post-  0.099
conflict year  (0.064)
Fifth post-  0.157
conflict year  (0.064)**
Sixth post-  0.182
conflict year  (0.058)***
Seventh post-  0.143
conflict year  (0.062)**
first three post-  0.674
conflict years  (0.821)
fourth -seventh  1.464
post-c. year  (0.573)**
Observations  344  344  344  344  344  344  344  344  344
p.-conflict obs.  13  13  13  13  13  13  13  13  13
_R_  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.38  0.37  0.37  0.37
Note: Robust standard errors  in parentheses.  ' significant at 10%; "  signifcant at 5%; "'  significant at 1%. All regressions  include
time dummies which are jointly significant.
16Table 3: Interaction Effects
____________  _(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Initialper  0.718  0.715  0.717  0.712  0.718  0.719  0.715  0.711
capita income  (0.627)  (0.621)  (0.618)  (0.617)  (0.629)  (0.627)  (0.625)  (0.624)
Govemance  0.196  0.197  0.198  0.172  0.158  0.158  0.153  0.147
(ICRGE)  (0.160)  (0.157)  (0.157)  (0.155)  (0.160)  (0.160)  (0.161)  (0.160)
cpia  0.991  0.991  0.988  1.021  0.996  0.999  1.017  1.017
(0.397)**  (0.396)**  (0.390)**  (0.392)***  (0.402)0*  (0.401)**  (0.396)**  (0.396)**
odacpiac  0.134  0.134  0.134  0.127  0.151  0.148  0.148  0.147
(0.066)**  (0.066)**  (0.065)*  (0.064)*  (0.066)**  (0.066)**  (0.066)**  (0.065)**
(ODA/GDP)
2 -0.028  -0.028  -0.028  -0.028  -0.029  -0.029  -0.029  -0.028
(0.012)**  (0:012)**  (0.012)**  (0.012)*-  (0.013)**  (0.013)**  (0.013)**  (0.013)**
South Asia  2.614  2.611  2.619  2.662  2.605  2.623  2.618  2.633
(0.644)***  (0.639)***  (0.625)***  (0.620)***  (0.629)***  (0.629)***  (0.630)**  (0.626)***
East Asia  2.891  2.889  2.884  2.880  2.847  2.855  2.866  2.883
(0.663)***  (0.660)***  (0.660)***  (0.660)***  (0.668)***  (0.667)*+*  (0.668)***  (0.664)***
Sub-Saharan  -0.440  -0.442  -0.442  -0.366  -0.569  -0.545  -0.556  -0.550
Africa  (0.821)  (0.817)  (0.816)  (0.809)  (0.830)  (0.827)  (0.820)  (0.817)
Middle East/  1.590  1.591  1.589  1.606  1.506  1.515  1.520  1.524
North Africa  (0.568)***  (0.567)***  (0.567)***  (0.563)***  (0.552)***  (0.554)***  (0.556)***  (0.553)***
Europe/  -0.400  -0.402  -0.403  -0.365  -0.353  -0.355  -0.354  -0.352
Central Asia  (1.059)  (1.056)  (1.054)  (1.053)  (1.074)  (1.068)  (1.067)  (1.064)
post-conflict  1  1.385  1.445  0.913
(3.237)  (3.073)  (0.755)
post-conflictl  -0.186  -0.180




post-conflictl  0.168  0.141  0.139  0.186
x (ODA/GDP) x  (0.330)  (0.042)**  (0.041)**  (0.046)***
CPIA
peace-onset x  0.033  -0.031  -0.033  -0.027
(ODA/GDP)
2 (0.231)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.019)
peace-onset  -0.594  -1.102  0.352
(5.531)  (5.579)  (1.179)
peace-onset x  0.502  0.516
CPIA  (1.648)  (1.691)
peace-o. x (ODA  -0.223









Observations  344  344  344  344  344  344  344  344
p.-conflict obs.  13  13  13  13  13  13  13  13
_  _  _  0.38  0.38  0.38  0.38  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.37
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  significant at  10%; **  significant  at 5%; '  significant at  1%. All regressions include time
dunmmies which  are Jointly significantTable 4: Aid Allocation
__  __  __  __  _  ___  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
initial per capita income  -2.329  -2.329  -2.324  -2.304
(0.241)***  (0.241)***  (0.242)***  (0.239)***
In Population  -0.717  -0.719  -0.712  -0.708
(0.080)***  (0.081)***  (0.081)***  (0.080)***
governance (ICRGE)  0.001  0.005  -0.013  -0.025
(0.082)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.083)
CPIA  0.274  0.277  0.282  0.288
(0.126)**  (0.126)**  (0.124)**  (0.127)**
South Asia  -0.203  -0.205  -0.187  -0.119
(0.274)  (0.272)  (0.280)  (0.279)
East Asia  0.061  0.054  0.065  0.095
(0.206)  (0.208)  (0.206)  (0.205)
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.376  0.378  0.390  0.432
(0.370)  (0.370)  (0.376)  (0.369)
Middle East/ North Africa  0.655  0.661  0.653  0.679
(0.319)**  (0.321)**  (0.317)**  (0.317)**
Europe/Central Asia  0.275  0.284  0.296  0.318
(0.292)  (0.298)  (0.293)  (0.294)
war months  -0.011  -0.012  -0.012  -0.013
(0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)**
peace-onset  0.287
(0.438)
post-conflict  1  -0.407
(0.607)
post-conflict 2  -1.058
(0.376)***
Observations  354  354  354  354
Post-conflict observations  14  13  8
R2 0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63
Note:  Dependent Variable:  ODA/GDP. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 10%;
significant at 5%;  ***  significant  at 1%. All regressions  include time dummies which are jointly
significant.Table 5: Means of Policy and Governance  Variables
all countries  post-conflict countries
Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  All
Periods
Policy (CPIA}  3.00  2.41  2.88  3.05  2.67
Macro policy  1.03  1.05  1.02  1.08  1.04
Structural policy'  0.99  0.98  1.01  0.94  0.98
Social policyl  0.97  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.98
Govemance (ICRGE)  4.73  3.67  3.61  3.47  3.60
'Relative  to the average of macro,  structural and social policies.
19Table 6: Policy Priorities
Initial per capita income  0.747  0.657
(0.622)  (0.651)
Governance  (ICRGE)  0.225  0.270
(0.162)  (0.159)*
CPIA  0.962  1.034
(0.396)**  (0.401)**
ODA/GDP x CPIA  0.157  0.143
(0.065)**  (0.063)**
(ODA/GDP)2 -0.031  -0.029
(0.013)**  (0.012)**
post-conflict 0-2  0.738  0.644
(2.813)  (0.855)
post-conflict 0-2 x Governance  0.109
(0.676)
South Asia  2.465  2.542
(0.624)***  (0.670)***
East Asia  2.824  2.623
(0.661)***  (0.683)***
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.608  -0.595
(0.811)  (0.845)
Middle East/ North Africa  1.502  1.384
(0.562)***  (0.542)**
Europe/Central Asia  -0.431  -0.266
(1.048)  (1.060)
Macro Policy  5.038
(3.711)
Social Policy  0.282
(3.671)
Postconflict 0-2 x Macro Policy  -13.162
(3.582)***
Postconflict 0-2 x Social Policy  16.167
(3.778)***
Observations  344  341
Post-conflict observations  34  34
R2  0.37  0.39
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***  significant  at
1%. All regressions include time dummies which are jointly significant.
20Appendix
Sample:
The core sample contains 349 observations from the following 62 countries:
Algeria, Argentina,  Bahamas,  Bangladesh, Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,  Cameroon,  Chile,
Colombia,  The  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo,  Costa  Rica  ,  Cote  d'Ivoire,
Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Salvador,  Ethiopia,  Gabon,  Gambia,  Ghana,
Guatemala,  Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,  Hungary,  India, Indonesia,  Jamaica,  Kenya,  South
Korea,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Malaysia,  Mali,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nicaragua,  Niger,
Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,
Singapore,  South Africa,  Sri Lanka,  Sudan,  Syria,  Tanzania,  Thailand,  Togo,  Trinidad
and Tobago,  Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela,  Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Variable Definitions:
We use information from two data sets for this paper.  The economic  and policy data was
taken from  Collier  and Dollar (2001)  and the conflict  data is based  on the  Collier  and
Hoeffler (2002a) data set. We list all civil wars in Table Al.
The Collier and Dollar data set is a panel, spanning  12  four year periods (1966-69,  1970-
73,  ... ,  1994-98)  for 199  countries, thus it contains  2388 potential observations.  In their
analysis Collier and Dollar  use data for the  six most recent periods (1974-77,  ... ,  1994-
97). Due to missing data their sample size is 349 observations.
Growth
The average annual growth rate of per capita GDP. Source: Collier and Dollar (2001).
Initial per capita income
Per capita income measured at the beginning of each sub-period  (1974,  1978,  ... ,  1994).
Data are in 1990 constant US dollars.  Source: Collier and Dollar (2001).
Policy
The  Policy  measure  used  is  the  World  Bank's  Country  Policy  and  Institutional
Assessment (CPIA). It ranges from  1 (poor) to 5 (good). The CPIA measure of policy has
20 equally weighted components divided into four categories as follows:
A.  Macroeconomic  Management and Sustainability of Reforms
1.  General Macroeconomic  Performance
2.  Fiscal Policy
3.  Management of External Debt
4.  Macroeconomic  Management Capacity
5.  Sustainability of Structural Reforms
21B.  Structural Policies for Sustainable and Equitable Growth
1.  Trade Policy
2.  Foreign Exchange Regime
3.  Financial Stability and Depth
4.  Banking Sector Efficiency  and Resource Mobilization
5.  Property Rights and Rule-based  Governance
6.  Competitive Environment for the Private Sector
7.  Factor and Product Markets
8.  Environmental  Policies and Regulations
C.  Policies for Social Inclusion
1.  Poverty Monitoring and Analysis
2.  Pro-poor Targeting and Programs
3.  Safety Nets
D.  Public Sector Management
1.  Quality of Budget and Public Investment Process
2.  Efficiency and Equity of Revenue  Mobilization
3.  Efficiency and Equity of Public Expenditures
4.  Accountability of the Public Service
Governance
We measure  governance  with the International  Country  Risk  Guide  (ICRG)  data, it is a
composite index and ranges from 1 (poor) to 6 (good).  Source:  Collier and Dollar (2002).
Overseas Development  Assistance
Overseas  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  is measured  as a percentage  of GDP.  Source:
Collier and Dollar (2002).
Post-conflict
Is a dummy variable, taking the value of one for the three periods after the war ended, i.e.
if the war ended in 1975  the dummy takes the value one for the following periods:  1974-
77,  1978-1981  and 1982-85.
Post-conflict  0
Is  a dummy variable,  taking the value  one for the period in which the war  ended,  i.e.  if
the war ended in 1975 the dummy takes the value one for the period:  1974-77.
Post-conflict  1
Is a dummy variable,  taking the value  one for the period after  the war ended,  i.e.  if the
war ended in 1975 the dummy takes the value one for the  1978-1981  period.
22Post-conflict  2
Is a dummy variable, taking a value of one for the second period after the war ended, i.e.
if the war ended in  1975 the dummy takes the value one for the  1982-1985 period.
Warmonths
Is the sum of months at war during the period.
Peace-onset
Is  the  number  of months  after  the  conflict  end.  We  only  consider  the  immediate  post
conflict period.  For example if the war ended in June  1975 this variable takes a value of
18 for period 1974-77 and zero for all other periods.
Post-conflict  Year
Post-conflict year indicates  how many  post-conflict years there  are  in each  sub-period.
We measure the number of months in the period that fall into the following category:  first
12 months post-conflict,  second  12  months post-conflict etc.  We consider the first eight
years since the end of the conflict.  As an example take a war that ended in June  1976:
for period 1974-77 yrl=6, yr2=12, yr3=0  ... yr8=0
for period 1978-81  yrl=O, yr2=O, yr3=12, yr4=12, yr5=12, yr6=12, yr7=0, yr8=0
for period 1982-85 yrl=O  ... yr6=O, yr7=12, yr8=12
1st - 3rd Post-conflict  year
Is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if either post-conflict year variables for
years  1  - 3 are positive.
4 th - 7th  Post-conflict year
Is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if either post-conflict year variables for
years 4 - 7 are positive.
23Table Al: Civil Wars
Country  Start of the  End of  the  peace-onset  postconflict 1  postconflict 2
War  War
Angola  11/75  05/91
Burundi  04/72  12/73  *
Burundi  08/88  08/88  *
Chad  03/80  08/88  *  *
Congo  97  10/97
El Salvador  10/79  01/92  *  **
Ethiopia  07/74  05/91  *  **
Guatemala  07/66  07/72  **
Guatemala  03/78  03/84  *  *  **
Guinea-Bissau  12/62  12/74  **  *
India  84  94  *
Indonesia  06/75  09/82  *  **  **
Iran  06/81  05/82  *
Jordan  09/70  09/70  *  *
Morocco  10/75  11/89  *  **  **
Mozambique  07/76  10/92  *
Nicaragua  10/78  07/79  *
Nicaragua  03/82  04/90  *  **
Nigeria  01/66  01/70  **
Nigeria  12/80  08/84  *  **  **
Pakistan  01/73  07/77  *  **  **
Peru  03/82  12/96  *
Philippines  09/72  12/96  *
Romania  12/89  12/89  *
Russia  12/94  08/96
Rwanda  10/90  07/94
Somalia  05/88  12/92  **
Sri Lanka  04/71  05/71  **  *4
Sudan  10/63  02/72  **  **
Uganda  10/80  04/88  *  *
Zimbabwe  12/72  12/79  *  **  **
Cols 2&4: two stars indicate that the post-conflict observations are included in the 344 sample, one star
indicates that the observation was also included in the 532 sample.
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